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Abstract
In order to build the collection of Cauchy reals as a set in constructive
set theory, the only Power Set-like principle needed is Exponentiation.
In contrast, the proof that the Dedekind reals form a set has seemed to
require more than that. The main purpose here is to show that Exponen-
tiation alone does not suffice for the latter, by furnishing a Kripke model
of constructive set theory, CZF with Subset Collection replaced by Expo-
nentiation, in which the Cauchy reals form a set while the Dedekind reals
constitute a proper class.
1 Introduction
In classical mathematics, one principal approach to defining the real numbers
is to use equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, and the
other is the method of Dedekind cuts wherein reals appear as subsets of Q with
special properties. Classically the two methods are equivalent in that the re-
sulting field structures are easily shown to be isomorphic. As often happens in
an intuitionistic setting, classically equivalent notions fork. Dedekind reals give
rise to several demonstrably different collections of reals when only intuitionistic
logic is assumed (cf. [18], Ch.5, Sect.5). Here we shall be concerned with the
most common and fruitful notion of Dedekind real which crucially involves the
(classically superfluous) condition of locatedness of cuts. These Dedekind reals
are sometimes referred to as the constructive Dedekind reals but we shall simply
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Award No. DMS-0301162.
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address them as the Dedekind reals. Even in intuitionistic set theory, with a
little bit of help from the countable axiom of choice (AC(N, 2)1 suffices; see [4],
8.25), Rd and Rc are isomorphic (where Rd and Rc denote the collections of
Dedekind reals and Cauchy reals, respectively). As Rc is canonically embedded
in Rd we can view Rc as a subset of Rd so that the latter result can be stated as
Rd = Rc. The countable axiom of choice is accepted in Bishop-style constructive
mathematics but cannot be assumed in all intuitionistic contexts. Some choice
is necessary for equating Rd and Rc as there are sheaf models of higher order
intuitionistic logic in which Rd is not isomorphic to Rc (cf. [6]). This paper will
show that the difference between Rd and Rc can be of a grander scale. When
is the continuum a set? The standard, classical construction of R as a set uses
Power Set. Constructively, the weaker principle of Subset Collection (in the
context of the axioms of Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory CZF) suf-
fices, as does even the apparently even weaker principle of Binary Refinement
[5]. In contrast, we shall demonstrate that there is a Kripke model of CZF with
Exponentiation in lieu of Subset Collection in which the Cauchy reals form a
set while the Dedekind reals constitute a proper class. This shows that Expo-
nentiation and Subset Collection Axiom have markedly different consequences
for the theory of Dedekind reals.
This paper proves the following theorems:
Theorem 1.1 (Fourman-Hyland [6]) IZFRef does not prove that the Dedekind
reals equal the Cauchy reals.
Theorem 1.2 CZFExp (i.e. CZF with Subset Collection replaced by Exponen-
tiation) does not prove that the Dedekind reals are a set.
Even though the proof of the first theorem given here could be converted
easily to the original Fourman-Hyland proof of the same, it is still included
because the conversion in the other direction, from the original sheaf proof to
the current Kripke model, is not obvious (to us at least); one might well want
to know what the Kripke model proof of this theorem is. Furthermore, it is
helpful as background to understand the construction of the second proof. While
the second proof could similarly be turned into a purely topological argument,
albeit of a non-standard type, unlike Gauss, we do not wish to cover our tracks.
The original intuition here was the Kripke model – indeed, we know of no
other way to motivate the unusual topological semantics and term structure –
and so it might be of practical utility to have that motivation present and up
front. These benefits of presenting the Kripke constructions notwithstanding,
this article is reader-friendly enough so that anyone who wanted to could simply
skip the sections on constructing the models and go straight to the definitions
of topological semantics (mod exchanging later on a few “true at node r”s with
“forced by some neighborhood of r”s).
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of Constructive
Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory and notions of real numbers, section 2 features a
1∀ r ⊆ N× 2[∀n ∈ N ∃i ∈ {0, 1} 〈n, i〉 ∈ r → ∃f : N → 2 ∀n ∈ N 〈n, f(n)〉 ∈ r].
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Kripke model of IZFRef in which R
d 6= Rc. Here IZFRef denotes Intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with the Reflection schema.2 In section 3 the
model of section 2 undergoes refinements and pivotally techniques of [8] are put
to use to engender a model of CZFExp in which R
d is a proper class.
1.1 Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory
In this subsection we will summarize the language and axioms for CZF . The
language of CZF is the same first order language as that of classical Zermelo-
Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF whose only non-logical symbol is ∈. The logic of CZF
is intuitionistic first order logic with equality. Among its non-logical axioms are
Extensionality, Pairing and Union in their usual forms. CZF has additionally
axiom schemata which we will now proceed to summarize.
Infinity: ∃x∀u
[
u ∈ x↔
(
∅ = u ∨ ∃v ∈ x u = v + 1
)]
where v + 1 = v ∪ {v}.
Set Induction: ∀x[∀y ∈ xφ(y)→ φ(x)] → ∀xφ(x)
Bounded Separation: ∀a∃b∀x[x ∈ b↔ x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)]
for all bounded formulae φ. A set-theoretic formula is bounded or restricted if it
is constructed from prime formulae using ¬,∧,∨,→, ∀x ∈ y and ∃x ∈ y only.
Strong Collection: For all formulae φ,
∀a
[
∀x ∈ a∃yφ(x, y) → ∃b [∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b φ(x, y) ∧ ∀y ∈ b ∃x ∈ a φ(x, y)]
]
.
Subset Collection: For all formulae ψ,
∀a∀b∃c∀u
[
∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b ψ(x, y, u) →
∃d ∈ c [∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ dψ(x, y, u) ∧ ∀y ∈ d ∃x ∈ aψ(x, y, u)]
]
.
The Subset Collection schema easily qualifies as the most intricate axiom of
CZF . To explain this axiom in different terms, we introduce the notion of
fullness (cf. [1]).
Definition 1.3 As per usual, we use 〈x, y〉 to denote the ordered pair of x and
y. We use Fun(g), dom(R), ran(R) to convey that g is a function and to
denote the domain and range of any relation R, respectively.
For sets A,B let A × B be the cartesian product of A and B, that is the
set of ordered pairs 〈x, y〉 with x ∈ A and y ∈ B. Let AB be the class of all
functions with domain A and with range contained in B. Let mv(AB) be the
2Reflection, Collection and Replacement are equivalent in classical set theory. Intuition-
istically, Reflection implies Collection which in turn implies Replacement, however, these
implications cannot be reversed (see [7] for the latter).
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class of all sets R ⊆ A×B satisfying ∀u ∈ A∃v ∈ B 〈u, v〉 ∈ R. A set C is said
to be full in mv(AB) if C ⊆mv(AB) and
∀R ∈mv(AB)∃S ∈ C S ⊆ R.
The expression mv(AB) should be read as the collection of multi-valued
functions from the set A to the set B.
Additional axioms we shall consider are:
Exponentiation: ∀x∀y∃z z = xy.
Fullness: ∀x∀y∃z z is full in mv(xy).
The next result provides an equivalent rendering of Subset Collection.
Proposition 1.4 Let CZF− be CZF without Subset Collection.
(i) CZF− + Subset Collection = CZF− + Fullness.
(ii) CZF ⊢ Exponentiation.
proof:[1], Proposition 2.2. (The equality in (i) is as theories: that is, they both
prove the same theorems.)
1.2 The Cauchy and Dedekind reals
Definition 1.5 A fundamental sequence is a sequence (rn)n∈N of rationals,
together with is a (Cauchy-)modulus f : N→ N such that
∀k ∀m,n ≥ f(k) |rm − rn| <
1
2k
,
where all quantifiers range over N.
Two fundamental sequences (rn)n∈N, (sn)n∈N are said to coincide (in symbols
≈) if
∀k∃n∀m ≥ n |rm − sm| <
1
2k
.
≈ is indeed an equivalence relation on fundamental sequences. The set of Cauchy
reals Rc consists of the equivalence classes of fundamental sequences relative to
≈. For the equivalence class of (rn)n∈N we use the notation (rn)n∈N/ ≈.
The development of the theory of Cauchy reals in [18], Ch.5, Sect.2-4 can be
carried out on the basis of CZFExp. Note that the axiom AC-NN!
3 is deducible
in CZFExp.
Definition 1.6 Let S ⊆ Q. S is called a left cut or Dedekind real if the
following conditions are satisfied:
3(∀m ∈ N ∃!n ∈ N φ(m,n)) → (∃f : N → N ∀m ∈ N φ(m, f(m)))
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1. ∃r(r ∈ S) ∧ ∃r′(r′ /∈ S) (boundedness)
2. ∀r ∈ S ∃r′ ∈ S (r < r′) (openness)
3. ∀rs ∈ Q [r < s→ r ∈ S ∨ s /∈ S] (locatedness)
For X ⊆ Q define X< := {s ∈ Q : ∃r ∈ X s < r}. If S is a left cut it follows
from openness and locatedness that S = S<.
Lemma 1.7 Let r = (rn)n∈N and r
′ = (r′n)n∈N be fundamental sequences of
rationals. Define
Xr := {s ∈ Q : ∃m s < (rf(m) −
1
2m
)}.
We then have
1. Xr is a Dedekind real.
2. Xr = Xr′ if and only if (rn)n∈N ≈ (r′n)n∈N.
3. Rc is a subfield of Rd via the mapping (rn)n∈N/ ≈ 7→ Xr.
Proof: Exercise or see [4], Section 8.4.
2 Rd 6= Rc
Theorem 2.1 (Fourman-Hyland [6]) IZFRef does not prove that the Dedekind
reals equal the Cauchy reals.
2.1 Construction of the Model
Let M0 ≺ M1 ≺ ... be an ω-sequence of models of ZF set theory and of
elementary embeddings among them, as indicated, such that the sequence from
Mn on is definable in Mn, and such that each thinks that the next has non-
standard integers. Notice that this is easy to define (mod getting a model of
ZF in the first place): an iterated ultrapower using any non-principal ultrafilter
on ω will do. (If you’re concerned that this needs AC too, work in L of your
starting model.) We will ambiguously use the symbol f to stand for any of the
elementary embeddings inherent in the Mn-sequence.
Definition 2.2 The frame (underlying partial order) of the Kripke model M
will be a (non-rooted) tree with ω-many levels. The nodes on level n will be the
reals from Mn. r
′ is an immediate successor of r iff r is a real from some Mn,
r′ is a real from Mn+1, and r and r
′ are infinitesimally close; that is, f(r)− r′,
calculated in Mn+1 of course, is infinitesimal, calculated in Mn of course. In
other words, in Mn, r is that standard part of r
′.
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The Kripke structure will be defined like a forcing extension in classical set
theory. That is, there will be a ground model, terms that live in the ground
model, and an interpretation of those terms, which, after modding out by =, is
the final model M . Since the current construction is mostly just a re-phrasing
of the topological, i.e. Heyting-valued, model of [6], the similarity with forcing,
i.e. Boolean-valued models, is not merely an analogy, but essentially the same
material, and so it makes some sense to present it the way people are used to
it.
Definition 2.3 The ground Kripke model has, at each node of level n, a copy
of Mn. The transition functions (from a node to a following node) are the
elementary embeddings given with the original sequence of models (and therefore
will be notated by f again).
Note that by the elementarity of the extensions, this Kripke model is a model
of classical ZF. More importantly, the model restricted to any node of level n is
definable in Mn, because the original M -sequence was so definable.
Definition 2.4 The terms are defined at each node separately. For a node at
level n, the terms are defined in Mn, inductively on the ordinals in Mn. At any
stage α, a term of stage α is a set σ of the form {〈σi, Ji〉 | i ∈ I}, where I is
some index set, each σi is a term of stage < α, and each Ji is an open subset
of the real line.
(Often the terms at stage α are defined to be functions from the terms of all
stages less than α, as opposed to the relations above, which may be non-total and
multi-valued. This distinction makes absolutely no difference. Such a relation
can be made total by sending all terms not yet in the domain to the empty set,
and functional by taking unions of second components.)
Intuitively, each open set J is saying “the generic real is in me.” Also, each
node r is saying “I am the generic, or at least somebody in my infinitesimal
universe is.” So at node r, J should count at true iff r ∈ J . These intuitions
will appear later as theorems. (Well, lemmas.)
The ground model can be embedded in this term structure: for x ∈Mn, its
canonical name xˆ is defined inductively as {〈yˆ,R〉 | y ∈ x}. Terms of the form
xˆ are called ground model terms.
Notice that the definition of the terms given above is uniform among the
Mn’s, and so any term at a node gets sent by the transition function f to
a corresponding term at any given later node. Hence we can use the same
functions f yet again as the transition functions for this term model. (Their
coherence on the terms follows directly from their coherence on the original
Mn’s.)
At this point in the construction of the Kripke model, we have the frame,
a universe (set of objects) at each node, and the transition functions. Now
we need to define the primitive relations at each node. In the language of set
theory, these are =M and ∈M (the subscript being used to prevent confusion
with equality and membership of the ambient models Mn). This will be done
via a forcing relation .
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Definition 2.5 J  σ =M τ and J  σ ∈M τ are defined inductively on σ and
τ , simultaneously for all open sets of reals J :
J  σ =M τ iff for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ J ∩ Ji  σi ∈M τ and vice versa
J  σ ∈M τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ and J ′ such that
r ∈ J ′ ∩ Ji  σ =M τi
(We will later extend this forcing relation to all formulas.)
Note that these definitions, for J, σ, τ ∈Mn, can be evaluated inMn, without
reference to Mn+1 or to future nodes or anything. Therefore J  φ (according
to Mn) iff f(J)  f(φ) (according to Mn+1), by the elementarity of f . So we
can afford to be vague about where various assertions are evaluated, since by
this elementarity it doesn’t matter. (The same will be true when we extend
forcing to all formulas.)
Definition 2.6 At node r, for any two terms σ and τ , σ =M τ iff, for some J
with r ∈ J , J  σ =M τ .
Also, at r, σ ∈M τ iff for some J with r ∈ J , J  σ ∈M τ .
Notation Satisfaction (in the sense of Kripke semantics) at node r will be
notated with |=, as in “r |= σ = τ”. This should not be confused with the
forcing relation , even though the latter symbol is often used in the literature
for Kripke satisfaction.
Thus we have a first-order structure at each node.
To have a Kripke model, the transition functions f must also respect this
first-order structure, =M and ∈M ; to wit:
Lemma 2.7 f is an =M and ∈M -homomorphism. That is, if σ =M τ then
f(σ) =M f(τ), and similarly for ∈M .
proof: If σ =M τ then let J be such that r ∈ J and J  σ =M τ . Then f(J) is
open, r′ ∈ f(J) because r′ is infinitesimally close to r, and f(J)  f(σ) =M f(τ)
by elementarity. Hence f(σ) =M f(τ). Similarly for ∈M .
We can now conclude that we have a Kripke model.
Lemma 2.8 This Kripke model satisfies the equality axioms:
1. ∀x x = x
2. ∀x, y x = y → y = x
3. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z
4. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z
5. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x→ z ∈ y.
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proof: 1: It is easy to show with a simultaneous induction that, for all J and
σ, J  σ =M σ, and, for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ, J ∩ Ji  σi ∈M σ.
2: Trivial because the definition of J  σ =M τ is itself symmetric.
3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 2.9 If J ′ ⊆ J  σ =M τ then J ′  σ =M τ , and similarly for ∈M .
proof: By induction on σ and τ .
Lemma 2.10 If J  ρ =M σ and J  σ =M τ then J  ρ =M τ .
proof: Again, by induction on terms. Let 〈ρi, Ji〉 ∈ ρ. Then J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈M σ,
i.e. for all r ∈ J ∩ Ji there are 〈σj , Jj〉 ∈ σ and J ′ ⊆ J ∩ Ji such that
r ∈ J ′ ∩ Jj  ρi =M σj . Fix any r ∈ J ∩ Ji, and let 〈σj , Jj〉 ∈ σ and J ′
be as given. By hypothesis, J ∩ Jj  σj ∈M τ . So let 〈τk, Jk〉 ∈ τ and
Jˆ ⊆ J ∩Jj be such that r ∈ Jˆ ∩Jk  σj =M τk. Let J˜ be J ′ ∩ Jˆ ∩Jj . Note that
J˜ ⊆ J ∩Ji, and that r ∈ J˜∩Jk. It remains only to show that J˜∩Jk  ρi =M τk.
Observing that J˜ ∩ Jk ⊆ J ′ ∩ Jj , Jˆ ∩ Jk, it follows by the previous lemma that
J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi =M σj , σj =M τk, from which the desired conclusion follows by the
induction.
Returning to proving property 3, the hypothesis is that for some J and K
containing r, J  ρ =M σ and K  σ =M τ . By the first lemma, J ∩K  ρ =M
σ, σ =M τ , and so by the second, J ∩K  ρ =M τ , which suffices.
4: Let J  ρ =M σ and K  ρ ∈M τ . We will show that J ∩K  σ ∈M τ .
Let r ∈ J ∩K. By hypothesis, let 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ, J ′ ⊆ K be such that r ∈ J ′ ∩Ji 
ρ =M τi; without loss of generality J
′ ⊆ J . By the first lemma, J ′∩Ji  ρ =M σ,
and by the second, J ′ ∩ Ji  σ =M τi.
5: Similar, and left to the reader.
With this lemma in hand, we can now mod out by =M , so that the symbol
“=” is interpreted as actual set-theoretic equality. We will henceforth drop
the subscript M from = and ∈, although we will not distinguish notationally
between a term σ and the model element it represents, σ’s equivalence class.
Note that, at any node r of level n, the whole structureM restricted to r and
its successors is definable in Mn, satisfaction relation |= and all. This will be
useful when showing below that IZF holds. For instance, to show Separation,
satisfaction r |= φ(x) will have to be evaluated in order to define the right
separation term in Mn, and so satisfaction must be definable in Mn.
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2.2 The Forcing Relation
The primitive relations = and ∈ were defined in terms of open sets J . To put
it somewhat informally, at r, σ = or ∈ τ if this is forced by a true set, and a set
J is true at r if r ∈ J . In fact, this phenomenon propagates to non-primitive
formulas. To show this, we extend the forcing relation J  φ from primitive
to all (first-order, finitary) formulas. Then we prove as a lemma, the Truth
Lemma, what was taken as a definition for the primitive formulas, that r |= φ
iff J  φ for some J containing r.
Definition 2.11 J  φ is defined inductively on φ:
J  σ = τ iff for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ and vice versa
J  σ ∈ τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ and J ′ such that r ∈
J ′ ∩ Ji  σ = τi
J  φ ∧ ψ iff J  φ and J  ψ
J  φ ∨ψ iff for all r ∈ J there is a J ′ containing r such that J ∩ J ′  φ or
J ∩ J ′  ψ
J  φ→ ψ iff for all J ′ ⊆ J if J ′  φ then J ′  ψ
J  ∃x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J there is a J ′ containing r and a σ such that
J ∩ J ′  φ(σ)
J  ∀x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J and σ there is a J ′ containing r such that
J ∩ J ′  φ(σ)
Lemma 2.12 1. For all φ ∅  φ.
2. If J ′ ⊆ J  φ then J ′  φ.
3. If Ji  φ for all i then
⋃
i Ji  φ.
4. J  φ iff for all r ∈ J there is a J ′ containing r such that J ∩ J ′  φ.
proof: 1. Trivial induction. The one observation to make regards negation, not
mentioned above. As is standard, ¬φ is taken as an abbreviation for φ → ⊥,
where ⊥ is any false formula. Letting ⊥ be “0=1”, observe that ∅  ⊥.
2. Again, a trivial induction.
3. Easy induction. The one case to watch out for is →, where you need to
invoke the previous part of this lemma.
4. Trivial, using 3.
Lemma 2.13 Truth Lemma: For any node r, r |= φ iff J  φ for some J
containing r.
proof: Again, by induction on φ, this time in detail for a change.
In all cases, the right-to-left direction (“forced implies true”) is pretty easy,
by induction. (Note that only the → case needs the left-to-right direction in
9
this induction.) Hence in the following we show only left-to-right (“if true at a
node then forced”).
=: This is exactly the definition of =.
∈: This is exactly the definition of ∈.
∧: If r |= φ ∧ ψ, then r |= φ and r |= ψ. Inductively let r ∈ J  φ and
r ∈ J ′  ψ. J ∩ J ′ suffices.
∨: If r |= φ ∨ ψ, then without loss of generality r |= φ . Inductively let
r ∈ J  φ. J suffices.
→: Suppose to the contrary r |= φ→ ψ but no open set containing r forces
such. Work in an infinitesimal neighborhood J around r. Since J 6 φ → ψ
there is a J ′ ⊆ J such that J ′  φ but J ′ 6 ψ. By the previous part of this
lemma, there is an r′ ∈ J ′ such that no open set containing r′ forces ψ. At the
node r′, by induction, r′ 6|= ψ, even though r′ |= φ (since r′ ∈ J ′  φ). This
contradicts the assumption on r (i.e. that r |= φ → ψ), since r′ extends r (as
nodes).
∃: If r |= ∃x φ(x) then let σ be such that r |= φ(σ). Inductively there is a J
containing r such that J  φ(σ). J suffices.
∀: Suppose to the contrary r |= ∀x φ(x) but no open set containing r forces
such. Work in an infinitesimal neighborhood J around r. Since J 6 ∀x φ(x)
there is an r′ ∈ J and σ such that for all J ′ containing r′ J ∩ J ′ 6 φ(σ). That
is, no open set containing r′ forces φ(σ). Hence at the node r′, by induction,
r′ 6|= φ(σ). This contradicts the assumption on r (i.e. that r |= ∀x φ(x)).
2.3 The Final Proof
We now want to show that our model M satisfies certain global properties. If it
had a bottom element ⊥, then we could express what we want by saying ⊥ |= φ
for certain φ. But it doesn’t. Hence we use the abbreviationM |= φ for “for all
nodes r, r |= φ.”
Theorem 2.14 M |= IZFRef .
proof: Note that, as a Kripke model, the axioms of intuitionistic logic are
satisfied, by general theorems about Kripke models.
• Infinity: ωˆ will do. (Recall that the canonical name xˆ of any set x ∈ Mn
is defined inductively as {〈yˆ,R〉 | y ∈ x}.)
• Pairing: Given σ and τ , {〈σ,R〉, 〈τ,R〉} will do.
• Union: Given σ, {〈τ, J ∩ Ji〉 | for some σi, 〈τ, J〉 ∈ σi and 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ}
will do.
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• Extensionality: We need to show that ∀x ∀y [∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x =
y]. So let σ and τ be any terms at a node r such that r |= “∀z (z ∈ σ ↔
z ∈ τ)”. We must show that r |= “σ = τ”. By the Truth Lemma, let
r ∈ J  “∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)”; i.e. for all r′ ∈ J, ρ there is a J ′ containing
r′ such that J ∩ J ′  ρ ∈ σ ↔ ρ ∈ τ . We claim that J  “σ = τ”, which
again by the Truth Lemma suffices. To this end, let 〈σi, Ji〉 be in σ; we
need to show that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . Let r′ be an arbitrary member of
J ∩ Ji and ρ be σi. By the choice of J , let J ′ containing r′ be such that
J ∩ J ′  σi ∈ σ ↔ σi ∈ τ ; in particular, J ∩ J ′  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ .
It has already been observed in 2.8, part 1, that J ∩ J ′ ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ,
so J ∩ J ′ ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . By going through each r′ in J ∩ Ji and using
2.12, part 3, we can conclude that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ , as desired. The other
direction (“τ ⊆ σ”) is analogous.
• Set Induction (Schema): Suppose r |= “∀x ((∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x))”,
where r ∈ Mn ; by the Truth Lemma, let J containing r force as much.
We must show r |= “∀x φ(x)”. Suppose not. Using the definition of
satisfaction in Kripke models, there is an r′ ∈ Mn′ extending (i.e. in-
finitesimally close to) r (hence in J in the sense ofMn′) and a σ such that
r′ 6|= f(φ)(σ) (f the transition from from node r to r′). By elementarity,
there is such an r′ inMn. Let σ be such a term of minimal V -rank among
all r′s ∈ J . Fix such an r′. By the Truth Lemma (and the choice of J),
r′ |= “(∀y ∈ σ φ(y)) → φ(σ)”. We claim that r′ |= “∀y ∈ σ φ(y)”. If
not, then for some r′′ extending r′ (hence in J) and τ, r′′ |= τ ∈ f(σ) and
r′′ 6|= f(φ)(τ). Unraveling the interpretation of ∈, this choice of τ can be
substituted by a term τ of lower V -rank than σ. By elementarity, such a τ
would exist in Mn, in violation of the choice of σ, which proves the claim.
Hence r′ |= φ(σ), again violating the choice of σ. This contradiction shows
that r |= “∀x φ(x)”.
• Separation (Schema): Let φ(x) be a formula and σ a term. Then {〈σi, J ∩
Ji〉 | 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and J  φ(σi)} will do.
• Power Set: A term σ¯ is a normal form subset of σ if for all 〈σi, J¯i〉 ∈ σ¯
there is a Ji ⊇ J¯i such that 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ. {〈σ¯,R〉 | σ¯ is a normal form
subset of σ} will do.
• Reflection (Schema): Recall that the statement of Reflection is that for
every formula φ(x) (with free variable x and unmentioned parameters)
and set z there is a transitive set Z containing z such that Z reflects the
truth of φ(x) in V for all x ∈ Z. So to this end, let φ(x) be a formula
and σ be a set at a node r of level n. Let k be such that the truth of
φ(x) at node r and beyond is Σk definable in Mn. In Mn, let X be a
set containing σ, r, and φ’s parameters such that X ≺k Mn. Let τ be
{〈ρ,R〉 | ρ ∈ X is a term}. τ will do.
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Just as in the case of regular, classical forcing, there is a generic element.
In the case at hand, this generic can be identified with the term {〈rˆ, J〉 | r is a
rational, J is an open interval from the reals, and r < J}, where r < J if r is less
than each element of J . We will call this term G. Note that at node r (of level
n), every standard (in the sense of Mn) rational less than r gets into G, and no
standard real greater than r will ever get into G. Of course, non-standard reals
infinitesimally close to r are still up for grabs.
It is important in the following that, if r |= σ ∈ Q, then there is a rational q
in the sense ofMn (n r’s level) such that r |= σ = q. That’s because rationals are
(equivalence classes of) pairs of naturals, and the corresponding fact holds for
naturals. And that last statement holds because M |= “Nˆ is the set of natural
numbers”, and the topological space on which the model is built is connected.
Hence, at r, a Cauchy sequence of rationals is just what you’d think: a sequence
with domain N in the sense of Mn, range Q in the sense of Mn, with the right
Cauchy condition on it, which gets extended to a larger domain at successors
of r.
Proposition 2.15 M |= “G is a constructive Dedekind real, i.e. a located left
cut”.
proof: First off, r |= “r − 1 ∈ G ∧ r + 1 6∈ G”. Secondly, if r |= “s < t ∈ G”,
then 〈t, J〉 ∈ G, where t < J and r ∈ J . Hence s < J , so 〈s, J〉 ∈ G, and
r |= s ∈ G. Finally, suppose r |= “s, t ∈ Q ∧ s < t”. Either s < r or r < t.
Since s and t are both standard (in the sense of Mn, n the level of r), either
r |= s ∈ G or r |= t 6∈ G respectively.
In order to complete the theorem, we need only prove the following:
Proposition 2.16 M |= “The Dedekind real G is not a Cauchy real.”
proof: Recall that a Cauchy sequence is a function f : N→ Q such that for all
k ∈ N there is an mk ∈ N such that, for all i, j > mk, f(i) and f(j) are within
2−k of each other. Classically such a function k 7→ mk, called a modulus of
convergence, could be defined from f , but not constructively (see [10]). Often
in a constructive setting a real number is therefore taken to be a pair of a Cauchy
sequence and such a modulus (or an equivalence class thereof). We will prove
the stronger assertion that G is not even the limit of a Cauchy sequence, even
without a modulus. (A Dedekind real Y is the limit of the Cauchy sequence f
exactly when r ∈ Y iff r < f(mk) − 2−k for some k, where mk is an integer as
above.)
Suppose r |= “f is a Cauchy sequence”. By the Truth Lemma, there is an
open set J containing r forcing the same. There are two cases.
CASE I: There is some open set J ′ containing r forcing a value f(m) for each
integer m in Mn (where r ∈ Mn). In this case, f is a ground model function;
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that is, in Mn, hence in eachMk with k ≥ n, g(m) can be defined as the unique
l such that J ′  f(m) = lˆ, and then J ′  f = gˆ. Since classical logic holds in
Mn, either lim(f) is bounded away from r, say by a distance of 2
−k, or it’s not.
If it is, then r |= G 6= lim(f), as follows. Let J ′′ be an interval around r of
length less than 2−k. J ′′  rˆ− 2−ˆk ∈ G ∧ rˆ+2−ˆk 6∈ G, while f stays more than
2−k away from r.
If on the other hand f is not bounded away from r, then the condition
“s < f(mk) − 2−k for some k” becomes simply “s < r”. So then f would
witness that s ∈ G iff s < r. But this is false: if r′ is less than r by an
infinitesimal amount, then r′ |= rˆ′ < rˆ but r′ 6|= rˆ′ ∈ G, and if r′ is greater than
r by an infinitesimal amount, and s is between r and r′, then r′ |= sˆ > rˆ but
r′ |= sˆ ∈ G.
CASE II: Not case I. That means that for any interval J ′ around r, however
small, there is some argument m to f such that J ′ does not force any value
f(m). By elementarity, in Mn+1 pick J
′ to be some infinitesimally small neigh-
borhood around r, and m such an argument. Pick some value q that f(m) could
have and the maximal (hence non-empty, proper, and open) subset of J ′ forcing
f(mˆ) = qˆ. Pick the maximal (hence non-empty, proper, and open) subset of
J ′ forcing f(mˆ) 6= qˆ. These two subsets must be disjoint, lest the intersection
force a contradiction. But an open interval cannot be covered by two disjoint,
non-empty open sets. Hence there is an infinitesimal s in neither of those two
subsets. Now consider the Kripke model at node s. f(m) is undefined at s.
Otherwise, by the Truth Lemma, there would be some interval J containing s
such that J  f(mˆ) = pˆ for some particular rational p. Whether or not p = q
would force s into one of the subsets or the other. Therefore, the node r cannot
force that f is total, contradicting the hypothesis that r forced that f was a
Cauchy sequence.
Comments and Questions Those familiar with the proof via the (full) topo-
logical model, or sheaves, over R, as in [6] for instance, will realize that it’s
essentially the same as the one above. In fact, the topological/sheaf construc-
tion can be read off of the argument above. All of the proofs are based on
constructing the right term and/or using an open set to force a statement.
That is exactly what’s present in a topological model: the terms here are the
standard terms for a topological model, and the forcing relation here is the stan-
dard topological semantics. So the Kripke superstructure is actually superfluous
for this argument. Nonetheless, several questions arise.
What the Kripke structure has that the topological model doesn’t are the
infinitesimals. Are they somehow hidden in the topological model? Are they
dispensable in the Kripke model? Or are the models more than superficially
different?
Also, is there some reason that the topology was necessary in the Kripke
construction? The authors started this project with the idea of using a Kripke
model, were led to infinitesimals, and did not suspect that any topological ideas
would be necessary. (In some detail, suppose you’re looking at a Dedekind cut
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in a node of a Kripke model. By locatedness, if p < q then one of those two
rationals gets put into either the lower or the upper cut; that is, we can remain
undecided about the placement of at most one rational, which for simplicity we
may as well take to be 0. Then why doesn’t the Cauchy sequence 1/n name
this cut? That can happen only if, at some later node, the cut no longer looks
to be around 0. But how can that happen if all other rationals are already
decided? Only if at this later node there are new rationals that weren’t there
at the old node. This leads directly to indexing nodes by infinitesimals, and
having the cut look at any node as though it’s defining the infinitesimal at that
node. Notice that there seems to be no reason to use topology here.) It was only
after several attempts to define the terms, with their equality and membership
relations, using just the partial order all failed that they were driven to the
current, topological solution. Since this all happened before we became aware
of the earlier Fourman-Hyland work, it is not possible that we were somehow
pre-disposed toward turning to topology. Rather, it seems that topology is
inherent in the problem. Is there some way to make that suggestion precise and
to see why it’s true?
Indeed, this question becomes even more pressing in light of the next section.
There topology is used in a similar way, but the terms and the semantics are like
nothing we have seen before. Indeed, the construction following could not be in
its essence a topological model of the kind considered so far in the literature,
since the latter always model IZF, whereas the former will falsify Power Set
(satisfying Exponentiation in its stead). So if there were some method to read
off the topology from the problem in this section, it would be of great interest
to see what that method would give us in the next problem.
There are other, soft reasons to have included the preceding construction,
even though it adds little to the Fourman-Hyland argument. Conceivably, some-
body could want to know what the paradigmatic Kripke model for the Cauchy
and Dedekind reals differing is, and this is it. It also provides a nice warm-up
for the more complicated work of the next section, to which we now turn.
3 The Dedekind Reals Are Not a Set
Theorem 3.1 CZFExp (i.e. CZF with Subset Collection replaced by Exponen-
tiation) does not prove that the Dedekind reals form a set.
3.1 The Construction
Any model showing what is claimed must have certain properties. For one, the
Dedekind reals cannot equal the Cauchy reals (since CZFExp proves that the
Cauchy reals are a set). Hence the current model takes its inspiration from the
previous one. Also, it must falsify Subset Collection (since CZF proves that the
Dedekind reals are a set). Hence guidance is also taken from [8], where such a
model is built.
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The idea behind the latter is that a (classical, external) relation R on N
keeps on being introduced into the model via a term ρ but at a later node
“disappears”; more accurately, the information ρ contains gets erased, because
ρ grows into all of N × N, thereby melting away into the other sets present
(to give a visual image). Since R is chosen so that it doesn’t help build any
functions, ρ can be ignored when proving Exponentiation. On the other hand,
while you’re free to include ρ in an alleged full set of relations, by the next node
there is no longer any trace of R, so when R reappears later via a different term
ρ′ your attempt at a full set no longer works.
In the present context, we will do something similar. The troublesome re-
lation will be (essentially) the Dedekind real G from the previous construction.
It will “disappear” in that, instead of continuing to change its mind about what
it is at all future nodes, it will settle down to one fixed, standard real at all
next nodes. But then some other real just like G will appear and pull the same
stunt.
We now begin with the definition of the Kripke model, which ultimately is
distributed among the next several definitions.
Definition 3.2 The underlying p.o. of the Kripke model is the same as above:
a (non-rooted) tree with ω-many levels, the nodes on level n being the reals from
Mn. r
′ is an immediate successor of r iff r is a real from some Mn, r
′ is a real
from Mn+1, and r and r
′ are infinitesimally close; that is, f(r)− r′, calculated
in Mn+1 of course, is infinitesimal, calculated in Mn of course. In other words,
in Mn, r is that standard part of r
′.
Definition 3.3 A term at a node of height n is a set of the form {〈σi, Ji〉 | i ∈
I} ∪ {〈σh, rh〉 | h ∈ H}, where each σ is (inductively) a term, each J an open
set of reals, each r a real, and H and I index sets, all in the sense of Mn.
The first part of each term is as in the previous section: at node r, Ji counts
as true iff r ∈ Ji. The second part plays a role only when we decide to have the
term settle down and stop changing. This settling down in described as follows.
Definition 3.4 For a term σ and real r ∈ Mn, σr is defined inductively in Mn
on the terms as {〈σri ,R〉 | 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ ∧ r ∈ Ji} ∪ {〈σ
r
h,R〉 | 〈σh, r〉 ∈ σ}.
Note that σr is (the image of) a set from the ground model. It bears obser-
vation that (σr)s = σr.
What determines when a term settles down in this way is the transition
function. In fact, from any node to an immediate successor, there will be two
transition functions, one the embedding f as before and the other the settling
down function. This fact of the current construction does not quite jive with
the standard definition of a Kripke model, which has no room for alternate ways
to go from one node to another. However, this move is standard (even tame)
for categorical models, which allow for arbitrary arrows among objects. So
while the standard categorical description of a partial order is a category where
the objects are the elements of the order and there’s an arrow from p to q iff
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p ≤ q, the category we’re working in has two arrows from p to q (for immediate
successors). If you’re still uncomfortable with this double arrow, or object to
calling this object a Kripke model, then double not the arrows but the nodes.
That is, replace each node s by two nodes sold and snew, and have the two
arrows go to these two separate nodes. Now you have a very traditional Kripke
model again. To save on subscripts, we will work instead with two arrows going
from r to s.
Definition 3.5 If s is an immediate successor of r, then there are two transition
functions from r to s, called f and g. f is the elementary embedding from Mn to
Mn+1 as applied to terms. g(σ) = f(σ)
s. Transition functions to non-immediate
successors are arbitrary compositions of the immediate transition functions.
When considering g(σ), note that σ ∈ Mn and s ∈ Mn+1. However, for
purposes other than the transition functions, we will have occasion to look at
σs for both σ and s from Mn. In this case, please note that, since f is an
elementary embedding, (f(σ))s = f(σs).
It’s easy to see that for σ a (term for a) ground model set, f(σ) is also a
ground model set, and for τ from the ground model (such as f(σ)) so is τr .
Hence in this case f(σ) = g(σ).
We do not need to show that the transition functions are well-defined, since
they are defined on terms and not on equivalence classes of terms. However,
once we define =, we will show that = is an equivalence relation and that f and
g respect =, so that we can mod out by = and still consider f and g as acting
on these equivalence classes.
Speaking of defining =, we now do so, simultaneously with ∈ and inductively
on the terms, like in the previous section. In an interplay with the settling down
procedure, the definition is different from in the previous section.
Definition 3.6 J  σ =M τ and J  σ ∈M τ are defined inductively on σ and
τ , simultaneously for all open sets of reals J:
J  σ =M τ iff for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ J∩Ji  σi ∈M τ and for all r ∈ J σr = τr,
and vice versa.
J  σ ∈M τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ and J ′ ⊆ J such that
r ∈ J ′ ∩ Ji  σ =M τi, and for all r ∈ J 〈σ
r ,R〉 ∈ τr.
(We will later extend this forcing relation to all formulas.)
Definition 3.7 At a node r, for any two terms σ and τ , r |= σ =M τ iff, for
some J with r ∈ J, J  σ =M τ .
Also, r |= σ ∈M τ iff for some J with r ∈ J, J  σ ∈M τ .
Thus we have a first-order structure at each node.
Corollary 3.8 The model just defined is a Kripke model. That is, the transition
functions are =M and ∈M -homomorphisms.
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proof: Note that the coherence of the transition functions is not an issue for
us. That is, normally one has to show that the composition of the transition
functions from nodes p to q and from q to r is the transition function from p to
r. However, in our case, the transition functions were given only for immediate
successors, and arbitrary compositions are allowed. So there’s nothing about
coherence to prove.
If r |= σ =M τ then let r ∈ J  σ =M τ . For s an immediate successor
of r, s is infinitesimally close to r, so s ∈ f(J). Also, by elementarity, f(J) 
f(σ) =M f(τ). Therefore, s |= f(σ) =M f(τ). Regarding g, by the definition of
forcing equality, f(σ)s = f(τ)s, that is, g(σ) = g(τ). It is easy to see that for
any term ρ R  ρ =M ρ, so s ∈ R  g(σ) =M g(τ), and s |= g(σ) =M g(τ).
Similarly for ∈M .
Lemma 3.9 This Kripke model satisfies the equality axioms:
1. ∀x x = x
2. ∀x, y x = y → y = x
3. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z
4. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z
5. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x→ z ∈ y.
proof: Similar to the equality lemma from the previous section. For those
who are concerned that the new forcing relation might make a difference and
therefore want to see the details, here they come.
1: It is easy to show with a simultaneous induction that, for all J and
σ, J  σ =M σ, and, for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ, J ∩ Ji  σi ∈M σ. Those parts of
the definition of =M and ∈M that are identical to those of the previous section
follow by the same inductive argument of the previous section. The next clauses,
in the current context, boil down to σr = σr, which is trivially true, and, for
〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and r ∈ Ji, 〈σri ,R〉 ∈ τ
r , which follows immediately from the
definition of τr .
2: Trivial because the definition of J  σ =M τ is itself symmetric.
3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 3.10 If J ′ ⊆ J  σ =M τ then J ′  σ =M τ , and similarly for ∈M .
proof: By induction on σ and τ .
Lemma 3.11 If J  ρ =M σ and J  σ =M τ then J  ρ =M τ .
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proof: The new part in the definition of J  ρ =M τ is that for all r ∈ J ρr =
τr. The corresponding new parts of the hypotheses are that, for such r, ρr = σr
and σr = τr , from which the desired conclusion follows immediately.
The old part of the definition follows, as before, by induction on terms.
Moreover, the proof is mostly identical. Starting with 〈ρi, Ji〉 ∈ ρ, we need to
show that J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ τ . The construction of τk remains as above. What’s
new is the demand, by the additional clause in the definition of forcing ∈, that,
for all r ∈ J ∩ Ji, 〈ρri ,R〉 ∈ τ
r . But that’s easy to see: 〈ρri ,R〉 ∈ ρ
r, by the
definition of ρr, and, as we’ve already seen, ρr = τr.
Returning to proving property 3, the hypothesis is that for some J and K
containing r, J  ρ =M σ and K  σ =M τ . By the first lemma, J ∩K  ρ =M
σ, σ =M τ , and so by the second, J ∩K  ρ =M τ , which suffices.
4: Let J  ρ =M σ and K  ρ ∈M τ . We will show that J ∩K  σ ∈M τ .
Let r ∈ J ∩K. By hypothesis, let 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ, J ′ ⊆ K be such that r ∈ J ′ ∩Ji 
ρ =M τi; without loss of generality J
′ ⊆ J . By the first lemma, J ′∩Ji  ρ =M σ,
and by the second, J ′ ∩ Ji  σ =M τi. Furthermore, ρr = σr and 〈ρr,R〉 ∈ τr ,
hence 〈σr ,R〉 ∈ τr .
5: Similar, and left to the reader.
With this lemma in hand, we can now mod out of =M at each node, and
have a model in which equality is actually =.
3.2 The Forcing Relation
As above, we define a forcing relation J  φ, with J an open set of reals and
φ a formula. The definition should be read as pertaining to all formulas with
parameters from a fixed Mn, and is to be interpreted in said Mn.
Definition 3.12 For φ = φ(σ0, ..., σi) a formula with parameters σ0, ..., σi, φ
r
is φ(σr0 , ..., σ
r
i ).
Definition 3.13 J  φ is defined inductively on φ:
J  σ = τ iff for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ and for all r ∈ J σr = τr,
and vice versa
J  σ ∈ τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ and J ′ ⊆ J such that r
∈ J ′ ∩ Ji  σ = τi and for all r ∈ J 〈σr ,R〉 ∈ τr
J  φ ∧ ψ iff J  φ and J  ψ
J  φ∨ψ iff for all r ∈ J there is a J ′ ⊆ J containing r such that J ∩J ′  φ
or J ∩ J ′  ψ
J  φ → ψ iff for all J ′ ⊆ J if J ′  φ then J ′  ψ, and, for all r ∈ J , if
R  φr then R  ψr
J  ∃x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J there is a J ′ containing r and a σ such that
J ∩ J ′  φ(σ)
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J  ∀x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J and σ there is a J ′ containing r such that
J ∩ J ′  φ(σ), and for all r ∈ J and σ there is a J ′ containing r such that
J ′  φr(σ).
(Notice that in the last clause, σ is not interpreted as σr.)
Lemma 3.14 1. For all φ ∅  φ.
2. If J’ ⊆ J  φ then J’  φ.
3. If Ji  φ for all i then
⋃
i Ji  φ.
4. J  φ iff for all r ∈ J there is a J’ containing r such that J ∩ J’  φ.
5. For all φ, J if J  φ then for all r ∈ J R  φr.
6. If φ contains only ground model terms, then either R  φ or R  ¬φ.
proof:
1. Trivial induction, as before.
2. Again, a trivial induction.
3. By induction. As in the previous section, for the case of →, you need to
invoke the previous part of this lemma. All other cases are straightforward.
4. Trivial, using 3.
5. By induction on φ.
Base cases: = and ∈: Trivial from the definitions of forcing = and ∈.
∨ and ∧: Trivial induction.
→: Suppose J  φ → ψ and r ∈ J . We must show that R  φr → ψr. For
the first clause, suppose K ⊆ R and K  φr. If K = ∅ then K  ψr. Else let
s ∈ K. Inductively, since s ∈ K  φr, R  (φr)s. But (φr)s = φr, so R  φr.
Using the hypothesis on J , R  ψr, and so by part 2 above, K  ψr. For the
second clause, let s ∈ R. If R  (φr)s then R  φr. By the hypothesis on J ,
R  ψr, and ψr = (ψr)s.
∃: If J  ∃x φ(x) and r ∈ J , let J ′ and σ be such that r ∈ J ∩ J ′  φ(σ).
By induction, R  φr(σr). σr witnesses that R  ∃x φr(x).
∀: Let J  ∀x φ(x) and r ∈ J . We need to show that R  ∀x φr(x). For the
first clause, we will show that for any σ, R  φr(σ). By part 4 above, it suffices
to let s ∈ R be arbitrary, and find a J ′ containing s such that J ′  φr(σ). By the
hypothesis on J , for every τ there is a J ′′ containing r such that J ′′  φr(τ).
Introducing new notation here, let τ be shiftr−sσ, which is σ with all the
intervals shifted by r−s hereditarily. So we have r ∈ J ′′  φr(shiftr−sσ). Now
shift by s − r. Letting J ′ be the image of J ′′, note that s ∈ J ′, the image of
shiftr−sσ is just σ, and the image of φ
r is just φr . Since the forcing relation is
unaffected by this shift, we have s ∈ J ′  φr(σ), as desired.
The second clause follows by the same argument. Given any s ∈ R and σ,
we need to show that there is a J ′ containing s such that J ′  (φr)s(σ). But
(φr)s = φr, and we have already shown that for all σ R  φr(σ).
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6. If R 6 φ, then we have to show that R  ¬φ, that is R  φ → ⊥. Since
φr = φ, the second clause in forcing an implication is exactly the case hypothe-
sis. The first clause is that for all non-empty J ⊆ R J 6 φ. If, to the contrary,
J  φ for some non-empty J , then, letting r ∈ J , by the previous part of this
lemma, R  φr ; since φr = φ, this contradicts the case hypothesis.
Lemma 3.15 Truth Lemma: For any node r, r |= φ iff J  φ for some J
containing r.
proof: By induction on φ, in detail.
=: Trivial, by the definition of =M .
∈: Trivial, by the definition of ∈M .
∧: Trivial.
∨: Trivial.
→: First we do the left-to-right direction (“if true at a node then forced”).
Suppose that for node r of tree height n, r |= φ→ ψ. Note that for s ∈Mn+1
infinitesimally close to r, if R  f(φ)s then (inductively) f(φ)s holds at any
successor node to r, in particular the one labeled s. Since r |= φ → ψ, and at
node s g(φ) = f(φ)s and g(ψ) = f(ψ)s, f(ψ)s would also hold at s. Inductively
f(ψ)s would be forced by some (non-empty) open set. Choosing any t from that
open set, by part 5 of this lemma, R  (f(ψ)s)t. Also (f(ψ)s)t = f(ψ)s. So
R  f(φ)s implies R  f(ψ)s for all s infinitely close to r. Hence by overspill
the same must hold for all s in some finite interval J containing r, and the
corresponding assertion in Mn: for all s ∈ J if R  φs then R  ψs. Note that
the same holds also for all subsets of J .
Suppose for a contradiction that no subset of J containing r forces φ→ ψ. In
Mn+1 let J
′ be an infinitesimal neighborhood around r. So J ′ 6 f(φ)→ f(ψ).
Since J ′ ⊆ J , the second clause in the definition of J ′  f(φ)→ f(ψ) is satisfied.
Hence the first clause is violated. Let J ′′ ⊆ J ′ be such that J ′′  f(φ), but
J ′′ 6 f(ψ). By part 4 of this lemma and the inductive hypothesis, let s ∈ J ′′
be such that s 6|= f(ψ). But s |= f(φ). So s 6|= f(φ) → f(ψ). This contradicts
r |= φ→ ψ.
For the right-to-left direction (“if forced then true”), suppose r ∈ J  φ→ ψ.
If r |= φ, then inductively let r ∈ J ′  φ. So r |= ψ, which persists at all
future nodes. Hence r |= φ→ ψ. The same argument applies unchanged to any
extension of r reached via a composition of only the f -style transition functions.
The other cases are compositions which include at least one g; without loss of
generality we can assume we’re using g to go from r to an immediate extension
s. If s |= g(φ), i.e. s |= f(φ)s, then by induction and by part 5 R  f(φ)s.
Also, by elementarity s ∈ J  f(φ)→ f(ψ). Hence, by the definition of forcing
→,R  f(ψ)s, so s |= f(ψ)s, i.e. s |= g(ψ).
∃: If r |= ∃x φ(x), then let σ be such that r |= φ(σ). Inductively there
is a J containing r such that J  φ(σ). J suffices. In the other direction, if
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r ∈ J  ∃x φ(x), let J ′ and σ be such that r ∈ J ∩ J ′  φ(σ). Inductively
r |= φ(σ), so r |= ∃x φ(x).
∀: For the left-to-right direction, suppose at node r that r |= ∀x φ(x). If
there were no interval J forcing the first clause in the ∀-forcing definition, then
let J be an infinitesimal neighborhood around r. Let s ∈ J and σ be such that
there is no J ′ containing s such that J ′  f(φ)(σ). Inductively s 6|= f(φ)(σ),
which is a contradiction.
If there were no interval J forcing the second clause in the ∀-forcing defini-
tion, then let J be an infinitesimal neighborhood around r. Let s ∈ J and σ
be such that there is no J ′ containing s such that J ′  f(φ)s(σ). Inductively
s 6|= f(φ)s(σ), i.e. s 6|= g(φ)(σ), which is a contradiction.
The right-to-left direction is trivial.
3.3 The Final Proof
It remains to show only
Theorem 3.16 M |= CZFExp
and
Theorem 3.17 M |= The Dedekind reals do not form a set.
proof: The only axioms below, the proofs of which are essentially different
from the corresponding proofs in section 2, are Set Induction, Strong Collection,
Separation, and, of course, Exponentiation.
• Infinity: As in the previous section, ωˆ will do. (Recall that the canonical
name xˆ of any set x ∈Mn is defined inductively as {〈yˆ,R〉 | y ∈ x}.)
• Pairing: As in the previous section, given σ and τ , {〈σ,R〉, 〈τ,R〉} will do.
• Union: Given σ, {〈τ, J ∩ Ji〉 | for some σi, 〈τ, J〉 ∈ σi and 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈
σ} ∪ {〈τ, r〉 | for some σi, 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σi and 〈σi, r〉 ∈ σ} will do.
• Extensionality: We need to show that ∀x ∀y [∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x =
y]. So let σ and τ be any terms at a node r such that r |= “∀z (z ∈ σ ↔
z ∈ τ)”. We must show that r |= “σ = τ”. By the Truth Lemma, let
r ∈ J  “∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)”; i.e. for all r′ ∈ J, ρ there is a J ′ containing
r′ such that J ∩ J ′  ρ ∈ σ ↔ ρ ∈ τ , and a J ′′ containing r′ such that
J ′′  ρ ∈ σr
′
↔ ρ ∈ τr
′
. We claim that J  “σ = τ”, which again by the
Truth Lemma suffices.
To this end, let 〈σi, Ji〉 be in σ; we need to show that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ .
Let r′ be an arbitrary member of J ∩ Ji and ρ be σi. By the choice of J ,
let J ′ containing r′ be such that J ∩ J ′  σi ∈ σ ↔ σi ∈ τ ; in particular,
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J ∩ J ′  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ . It has already been observed in 3.9, part 1,
that J ∩J ′∩Ji  σi ∈ σ, so J ∩J ′∩Ji  σi ∈ τ . By going through each r′
in J ∩ Ji and using 3.14, part 3, we can conclude that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ , as
desired. The other direction (“τ ⊆ σ”) is analogous. Thus the first clause
in J  “σ = τ” is satisfied.
The second clause is that, for each r ∈ J , σr = τr . That holds because σr
and τr are ground model terms: σr = xˆ and τr = yˆ for some x, y ∈ Mn.
If x 6= y, then let z be in their symmetric difference. Then no set would
force zˆ ∈ xˆ↔ zˆ ∈ yˆ, contrary to the assumption on J .
• Set Induction (Schema): Suppose r |= “∀x ((∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x))”,
where r ∈ Mn; by the Truth Lemma, let J containing r force as much.
We must show r |= “∀x φ(x)”; again by the Truth Lemma, it suffices to
show that J forces the same.
If not, then there is a σ and an r ∈ J such that either there is no J ′
containing r forcing φ(σ) or there is no J ′ containing r forcing φr(σ). In
Mn, pick such a σ of minimal V -rank. We will show that neither option
above is possible.
By the choice of J and 3.14 part 3, J  “(∀y ∈ σ φ(y)) → φ(σ)”. If
we show that J  “∀y ∈ σ φ(y)”, then we can conclude that J  φ(σ),
eliminating the first option above.
Toward the first clause in forcing a universal, let τ be a term. We claim
that J  “τ ∈ σ → φ(τ)”, which suffices. Regarding the first clause
in forcing an implication, suppose K ⊆ J and K  τ ∈ σ. Unraveling
the definition of forcing ∈, for each s ∈ K, there is an L containing s
forcing τ to equal some term ρ of lower V -rank than σ. By the minimality
of σ, some neighborhood of s forces φ(ρ), hence also φ(τ) (perhaps by
restricting to L). By 3.14 part 3, K also forces φ(τ). Thus the first
clause in J  “τ ∈ σ → φ(τ)” is satisfied. The second clause in forcing
an implication is that, for all r ∈ J , if R  τr ∈ σr then R  φr(τr). If
R  τr ∈ σr, then τr is forced to be equal to some ground model term xˆ of
lower V -rank than σ. By the minimality of σ, R  φr(xˆ), i.e. R  φr(τr).
Thus the first clause in J  “∀y ∈ σ φ(y)” is satisfied.
Toward the second clause in that universal, given τ and r ∈ J , we must
find a J ′ containing r with J ′  τ ∈ σr → φr(τ). We claim that J suffices;
that is, (i) for all K ⊆ J , if K  τ ∈ σr then K  φr(τ), and (ii) for all
s ∈ J , if R  τs ∈ σr then R  φr(τs) (using here that (σr)s = σr and
(φr)s = φr). Regarding (i), if K ⊆ J forces τ ∈ σr, then for each t ∈ K
there is a neighborhood L of t forcing τ = xˆ, for some x ∈ Mn. If L did
not force φr(xˆ), then, by 3.14 part 6, R  ¬φr(xˆ), where xˆ has lower rank
than σ, contradicting the choice of σ. So L  φr(xˆ), and L  φr(τ). Since
each t ∈ K has such a neighborhood, K  φr(τ). Similarly for (ii): If
R  τs ∈ σr , then τs has lower rank than σ; by the minimality of σ, it
cannot be the case that R  ¬φr(τs), hence, by 3.14 part 6, R  φr(τs).
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We have just finished proving that J  “∀y ∈ σ φ(y)”, and so J  φ(σ).
Hence the first option provided by the minimality of σ is not possible.
The other option is that for some r ∈ J there is no J ′ containing r forcing
φr(σ). We will show this also is not possible.
Fix r ∈ J . By the choice of J (using the second clause in the definition
of forcing ∀), there is a J ′ containing r such that J ′  “(∀y ∈ σ φr(y))→
φr(σ)”. If we show that J ′  “∀y ∈ σ φr(y), then we can conclude
J ′  φr(σ), for our contradiction.
Toward the first clause in forcing a universal, let τ be a term. We claim
that J ′  “τ ∈ σ → φr(τ)”, which suffices. Regarding the first clause
in forcing an implication, suppose K ⊆ J ′ and K  τ ∈ σ. We need to
show K  φr(τ). It suffices to find a neighborhood of each s ∈ K forcing
φr(τ). So let s ∈ K. Unraveling the definition of forcing ∈, there is a K ′
containing s forcing τ to equal some term ρ of lower V -rank than σ. Shift
(as in the proof of 3.14 part 5) by r−s. Since the parameters in φr are all
ground model terms, shiftr−s(φ
r) = φr. Also, rk(shiftr−sρ) = rk(ρ) <
rk(σ). By the minimality of σ, there is some neighborhood L of r forcing
φr(shiftr−sρ). Shifting back, we get shifts−r(L) containing s and forcing
φr(ρ). Then s ∈ K ′ ∩ shifts−r(L)  φr(τ), as desired.
The second clause in forcing an implication is that, for all s ∈ J ′, if
R  τs ∈ σs then R  φr(τs). If R  τs ∈ σs, then τs is forced to
be equal to some ground model term xˆ of lower V -rank than σ. By the
minimality of σ, it cannot be the case that R  ¬φr(xˆ), so, by 3.14 part
6, R  φr(xˆ), i.e. R  φr(τs). Thus the first clause in J  “∀y ∈ σ φ(y)”
is satisfied.
Toward the second clause in that universal, given τ and s ∈ J ′, we must
find a neighborhood of s forcing τ ∈ σs → φr(τ). We claim that J ′ suffices;
that is, (i) for all K ⊆ J ′, if K  τ ∈ σs then K  φr(τ), and (ii) for all
t ∈ J ′, if R  τ t ∈ σs then R  φr(τ t). For (i), if K ⊆ J ′ forces τ ∈ σs,
then for each t ∈ K there is a neighborhood L of t forcing τ = xˆ, for some
x ∈Mn. If L did not force φr(xˆ), then, by 3.14 part 6, R  ¬φr(xˆ), where
xˆ has lower rank than σ, contradicting the choice of σ. So L  φr(xˆ),
and L  φr(τ). Since each t ∈ K has such a neighborhood, K  φr(τ).
Similarly for (ii): If R  τ t ∈ σs, then τ t has lower rank than σ; by the
minimality of σ, it cannot be the case that R  ¬φr(τ t), hence, by 3.14
part 6, R  φr(τ t).
• Exponentiation: Let σ and τ be terms at node r. Let C be {〈ρ, J〉 |
rk(ρ) < max(rk(σ), rk(τ))+ω, and J  ρ : σ → τ is a function}∪{〈hˆ, s〉 |
h : σs → τs is a function}. (The restriction on ρ is so that C is set-sized.)
We claim that C suffices.
Let s be any immediate extension of r. (The case of non-immediate ex-
tensions follows directly from this case.) If s |= “ρ : f(σ) → f(τ) is a
function”, then s |= ρ ∈ f(C) by the first clause in the definition of C. If
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s |= “ρ : g(σ) → g(τ) is a function” and ρ is a ground model term, then
s |= ρ ∈ g(C) by the second clause. What we must show is that for any
node r and sets X and Y , if r |= “ρ : Xˆ → Yˆ is a function”, then some
neighborhood of r forces ρ equal to a ground model function.
By the Truth Lemma, let r ∈ J  “ρ : Xˆ → Yˆ is a function”. We claim
that for all x ∈ X there is a y ∈ Y such that for each s ∈ J s |= ρ(xˆ) = yˆ.
If not, let x be otherwise. Let y be such that r |= ρ(xˆ) = yˆ. For each
immediate successor s of r, s |= f(ρ)(f(xˆ)) = f(yˆ). By overspill the same
holds for some neighborhood around r (sans the f ’s). If this does not hold
for all s ∈ J , let s be an endpoint in J of the largest interval around r
for which this does hold. Repeating the same argument around s, there
is a y′ such that, for all t in some neighborhood of s, t |= ρ(xˆ) = yˆ′. This
neighborhood of s must overlap that of r, though. So y = y′, contradicting
the choice of s. So the value ρ(xˆ) is fixed on the whole interval J , and ρ
is forced by J to equal a particular ground model function.
• Separation: Although CZF contains only ∆0 Separation, full Separation
holds here. Let φ(x) be a formula and σ a term. Then {〈σi, J ∩ Ji〉 |
〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and J  φ(σi)} ∪ {〈x, s〉 | 〈x,R〉 ∈ σs and R  φs(x)} will do.
• Strong Collection: If r |= ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y), let r ∈ J force as much. For
each 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and s ∈ J ∩ Ji, let τi,s and Ji,s be such that s ∈ Ji,s 
φ(σi, τi,s). Also, for each s ∈ J and 〈x,R ∈ σ
s, let τx,s be such that some
neighborhood of s forces φs(x, τx,s). (Notice that, by 3.14 part 5, R 
φs(x, τsx,s).) Then {〈τi,s, Ji,s〉 | i ∈ I, s ∈ J} ∪ {〈τx,s, s〉 | s ∈ J, x ∈ σ
s}
suffices.
proof: First note that the same generic term from the last section, G := {〈rˆ, J〉 |
r is a rational, J is an open interval from the reals, and r < J}, still defines a
Dedekind cut. In fact, half of the proof of such is just the argument from the
last section itself. That’s because most of the properties involved with being a
Dedekind real are local. For instance, if s < t are rationals at any given node,
then it must be checked at that node whether s ∈ G or t 6∈ G. For this, the
earlier arguments work unchanged. The same applies to images of G at later
nodes, as long as such image satisfies the same definition, i.e. is of the form
f(G). We must check what happens when G settles down. Cranking through
the definition, Gs = {〈rˆ,R〉 | r < s}, which is the Dedekind cut standing for s,
and which satisfies all the right properties.
Furthermore, although G can become a ground model real, it isn’t one itself:
there are no J and r such that J  G = rˆ. That’s because there is a K ⊆ J
with either r < s < K or K < s < r (some s). In the former case, K  sˆ ∈ G,
i.e. K  rˆ < G; in the latter, K  ¬sˆ ∈ G, i.e. K  rˆ > G.
Finally, to see that the Dedekind reals do not form a set, let σ be a term at
any node. g(σ) is a ground model term. So if any J  G ∈ g(σ), then for some
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K ⊆ J , K  G = rˆ for some real r, which we just saw cannot happen. So σ
cannot name the set of Dedekind reals.
Not infrequently, when some weaker axioms are shown to hold, what interests
people is not why the weaker ones are true but why the stronger ones aren’t.
The failure of Subset Collection, and hence of Power Set too, is exactly what
the previous paragraph is about, but perhaps the failure of Power Set is more
clearly seen on the simpler set 1 = {0} = {∅}. After applying a settling down
transition function g to a set σ, the only subsets of 1 in g(σ) are 0 and 1. But in
M 1 has more subsets than that. For instance, at node r, {〈∅, J〉 | min J > r}
is 0 at all future nodes s < f(r) and 1 at all future nodes s > f(r). So σ could
never have been the power set of 1 to begin with, because g(σ) is missing some
such subsets.
This same example also shows that Reflection fails: that the power set of 1
does not exist is true in M , as above, but not true within any set, as once that
set settles down, {0, 1} is indeed the internal power set of 1.
Comments and Questions The settling down process, as explained when
introduced, was motivated by the construction in [8]. The change in the terms
(adding members based not on open sets but on individual real numbers, to
be used only when settling down) was quickly seen to be necessary to satisfy
Separation. But where does the unusual topological semantics come from? The
topology is the same: the space is still R, the only things that force statements
are the same open sets as before; it’s just a change in the meaning of the forcing
relation , the semantics. It is no surprise that there would have to be some
change, in the base cases (= and ∈) if nowhere else. But why exactly those
changes as presented in the inductive cases? The authors found them through
a bothersome process of trial and error, and have no explanation for them.
Would this new semantics have interesting applications elsewhere? As an
example of a possible kind of application, consider the topology of this article.
Under the standard semantics, there is a Dedekind cut which is not a Cauchy
sequence. With the new semantics, the collections of Dedekind and Cauchy reals
differ (the latter being a set and the former not), but not for that reason. In
fact, any Dedekind cut is not not equal to a Cauchy real: just apply a settling
down transition. These collections differ because the Dedekind reals include
some things that are just not yet Cauchy reals. So this semantics might be
useful for gently separating concepts, getting sets (or classes) of things to be
unequal without producing any instance of one which is not the other.
Finally, which axioms does this new semantics verify? For instance, in [10] a
topological model for a generic Cauchy sequence is given. Analogously with the
current construction, wherein a generic Dedekind cut in a model with settling
down implies that there is no set of Dedekind cuts, in a model with settling
down and a generic Cauchy sequence the Cauchy sequences are not a set. That
would mean that not even Exponentiation holds. So what does hold generally
under this semantics?
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